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Abstract
Background
It has long been contested that trade rules and agreements are used to dispute regulations
aimed at preventing noncommunicable diseases (NCDs). Yet most analyses of trade rules
and agreements focus on trade disputes, potentially overlooking how a challenge to a regu-
lation’s consistency with trade rules may lead to ‘policy or regulatory chill’ effects whereby
countries delay, alter, or repeal regulations in order to avoid the costs of a dispute. System-
atic empirical analysis of this pathway to impact was previously prevented by a dearth of
systematically coded data.
Methods and findings
Here, we analyse a newly created dataset of trade challenges about food, beverage, and
tobacco regulations among 122 World Trade Organization (WTO) members from January
1, 1995 to December 31, 2016. We thematically describe the scope and frequency of trade
challenges, analyse economic asymmetries between countries raising and defending them,
and summarise 4 cases of their possible influence. Between 1995 and 2016, 93 food, bever-
age, and tobacco regulations were challenged at the WTO. ‘Unnecessary’ trade costs were
the focus of 16.4% of the challenges. Only one (1.1%) challenge remained unresolved and
escalated to a trade dispute. Thirty-nine (41.9%) challenges focussed on labelling regula-
tions, and 18 (19.4%) focussed on quality standards and restrictions on certain products like
processed meats and cigarette flavourings. High-income countries raised 77.4% (n = 72) of
all challenges raised against low- and lower-middle–income countries. We further identified
4 cases in Indonesia, Chile, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia in which challenges were associ-
ated with changes to food and beverage regulations. Data limitations precluded a compre-
hensive evaluation of policy impact and challenge validity.
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Conclusions
Policy makers appear to face significant pressure to design food, beverage, and tobacco
regulations that other countries will deem consistent with trade rules. Trade-related influ-
ence on public health policy is likely to be understated by analyses limited to formal trade
disputes.
Author summary
Why was this study done?
• There is a debate about whether World Trade Organization (WTO) rules are invoked to
prevent governments from introducing food, beverage, and tobacco regulations aimed
at preventing noncommunicable diseases (NCDs).
• Select case studies have identified how countries may delay, alter, or repeal regulations
in order to avoid the costs of a dispute following such a ‘trade challenge’.
• Yet little is known about how often this might occur, about which policies, and about
whether there is any evidence of policy impact.
What did the researchers do and find?
• We created and analysed a new dataset of trade challenges to food, beverage, and
tobacco regulations among 122 WTO members during the period from 1995 to 2016.
• We found that, between 1995 and 2016, 93 food, beverage, and tobacco regulations were
challenged at the WTO. ‘Unnecessary’ trade costs were the focus of 16.4% of challenges.
• We also identified 4 cases in which challenges were associated with policy change.
What do these findings mean?
• Policy makers appear to face significant pressure to design food, beverage, and tobacco
regulations that other countries will deem consistent with trade rules.
• However, more research is necessary to evaluate the validity and influence of challenges.
Introduction
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are now the leading cause of death worldwide, a major
impediment to poverty reduction, and estimated to cost the global economy US$47 trillion
over the next two decades [1]. At the highest political level, there is now recognition of the
urgency of addressing NCDs: the UN Sustainable Development Goals, adopted by 193 coun-
tries in September 2015, included a target to reduce mortality from NCDs by one-third by
2030. This follows from the UN Political Declaration on the Prevention and Control of NCDs,
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agreed on in September 2011 [2,3]. To achieve these goals, WHO recommends ‘best buys’ for
combatting NCDs, which are low-cost and potentially even revenue-generating. Many recom-
mended policies are fiscal or regulatory, including labelling regulations on processed food and
alcoholic beverages [4,5], taxes on sugar-sweetened beverages [5], and plain packaging of
tobacco [6]. While there is strong evidence to support them, implementation is often chal-
lenged by vested economic interests [7].
One longstanding debate is whether trade rules and agreements are used to undermine
food, beverage, and tobacco regulations aimed at preventing NCDs. This broad debate centres
on binding and enforceable treaties that include rules designed to reduce barriers to cross-bor-
der trade in food, beverage, and tobacco products [8]. This pertains to a wide range of treaties
including (i) the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its suite of trade agreements, (ii)
regional or free trade agreements (FTAs) between at least two countries—which arose in the
wake of WTO-stalemated negotiations, import much of the WTO treaties and then add further
liberalisation components (so-called ‘WTO+’ measures), and often include investor–state dis-
pute settlement chapters—and (iii) bilateral treaties applying to trade and/or investment,
including bilateral investment treaties.
For example, WTO members are obliged to design new regulations and policies that are
consistent with the rules set out in the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement (Box 1).
Critics argue that invoking these rules could restrict ‘policy space’, or the freedom, scope, and
mechanisms that governments have to design, choose, and implement public policies in order
Box 1. The WTO TBT agreement and associated proceedings
The TBT Agreement. The WTO is an intergovernmental organisation that coordinates
the rules of trade between its members. It comprised 164 countries in July 2017, with 21
countries awaiting accession [52]. Countries that join the WTO sign a series of accession
agreements, including the TBT Agreement. The TBT Agreement is binding on all mem-
bers of the WTO. The rules in the Agreement state that new measures must not intro-
duce ‘unnecessary trade costs’ or barriers to trade, especially if the stated objective of the
measure—such as protecting public health—could be achieved with a less costly alterna-
tive. In addition, governments must ensure that measures do not discriminate against
foreign products (in favour of domestic producers) or between foreign producers (for
example, by favouring one country over another). The TBT Agreement also strongly
encourages the use of international standards, although the Agreement recognises that
some international standards may not be appropriate in certain countries and regions or
in new policy domains. Finally, members must meet certain transparency obligations,
described as a ‘cornerstone’ (WTO, p. 24) of the TBT Agreement.
The TBT committee and trade challenges. Governments are obliged to notify other
members of any new proposed regulation and provide sufficient information before it
enters into force so that trading partners have the opportunity to receive feedback from
industry and to provide comments at the TBT Committee that can be taken into
account.
These notifications are then discussed at the WTO, where other country members have
the opportunity to challenge policies that they think violate the TBT Agreement at bi-
annual meetings of the TBT Committee in Geneva [53]. This constitutes a ‘trade
challenge’.
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PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590 June 26, 2018 3 / 18
to fulfil health-related priorities and aims’ [9,10]. This may happen because the TBT Agree-
ment enables foreign governments to dispute policies enacted by another government that
they think violate the TBT Agreement. Formal dispute settlement procedures may mandate a
change, delay, or even reversal of the policy, or compensatory trade penalties [11].
There is, however, ongoing debate about whether rules such as those set out in the WTO
TBT Agreement actually do impede NCD prevention. The TBT Agreement recognises a gov-
ernment’s right to pursue a range of ‘legitimate’ policy objectives, including the protection of
human health, even if the regulation increases trade costs [12–14]. Only a few disputes about
NCDs have arisen to date, and there is little evidence that they actually lead to policy changes
[15]. Most studies were in legal scholarship and mainly regard the practical application of laws.
For example, Mitchell and Voon (2011) evaluated whether WTO trade rules cohere with
WHO’s recommended policies for reducing NCDs. They conclude that it is feasible to design
public health policies that minimise adverse trade effects [15]. Bloche (2002) and Gostin
(2008), in a study of WTO disputes, report that judges tend to defer to national authority when
deciding outcomes, partly to avoid criticisms of judicial overreach [12,13], although the same
is not the case with the independent tribunals overseeing investor–state disputes, which are
widely regarded as procedurally flawed.
One major limitation of previous empirical scholarship is that it mainly focuses on formally
adjudicated trade disputes. However, political economy analyses of conflict have observed that
an emphasis on overt and formal conflicts, like formal WTO disputes, may obscure a substan-
tially more significant ‘hidden hand’ of influence: how a challenge to a regulation’s consistency
with trade rules raised in an intergovernmental committee may lead to ‘policy or regulatory
chill’ effects, whereupon a government delays, alters, or abandons its policy in order to avoid
the costs associated with a dispute [9,16,17]. For example, as several commentators have noted
[11,18–20], governments may raise trade challenges at the WTO TBT Committee that lead to a
change in policy. This can occur regardless of whether WTO rules do actually provide suffi-
cient flexibility for introducing regulations to protect public health because governments may
make claims that are invalid but are not formally scrutinised or may be uncertain in the
absence of a formally adjudicated trade dispute [21].
Governments have incentives to avoid trade disputes because of the legal, administrative,
and economic costs associated with defending their policies. These costs can be substantial; it
was reported that Australia, for example, spent over US$50 million defending plain tobacco
packaging against disputes citing WTO rules and other trade and investment treaties [22].
Philip Morris was subsequently ordered to pay the government’s legal fees (the exact amount
was not revealed), but this was an unknown outcome when the Australian government had to
incur its defensive costs.
Trade disputes can also carry significant political costs. Although the rules and procedures
for resolving WTO disputes are designed to be non-contentious [23], governments may fear
their political consequences and their impact on future trade negotiations [24]. The uncer-
tainty and costs associated with trade disputes may especially deter developing countries,
which are politically and economically dependent on trade with wealthier nations and have
fewer economic resources to devote to legal and administrative costs [25,26].
Thus, analyses of trade disputes may give an incomplete account of the mechanisms and
number of cases in which governments have invoked WTO rules in a trade challenge and sub-
sequently influenced policy space for NCD prevention, especially in developing countries. Pre-
vious studies of these trade challenges comprised theoretical commentaries, case studies, and
reviews. One highly cited example of a deterrent effect comes from Thailand’s proposed intro-
duction of a traffic light–labelling system in 2006. Under pressure from the United States,
which argued that the policy contravened WTO rules, the Thai government abandoned its
Trade challenges at the World Trade Organization to noncommunicable disease prevention policies
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preferred approach and implemented monochrome daily guideline labels, thereby preventing
escalation to a trade dispute [19]. Relatedly, Thow et al. (2017) analysed five trade challenges to
new food-labelling regulations proposed by Indonesia, Peru, Ecuador, Thailand, and Chile
during WTO meetings [27]. Lencucha et al. (2016) similarly analysed arguments against plain
tobacco legislation during trade disputes and predispute trade challenges at the WTO [28].
To our knowledge, the number and scope of trade challenges has yet to be systematically
investigated, in part because—while textual data exist—they have yet to be codified into a
quantitative dataset. This precludes a systematic understanding of the scope and frequency
with which trade rules are invoked to challenge and potentially influence food, beverage, and
tobacco regulations in practice [10,11,29]. Many fundamental questions therefore remain
poorly understood: how common are trade challenges to food, beverage, or tobacco regula-
tions? What proportion of trade challenges escalate to trade disputes? What products and poli-
cies are under scrutiny, what trade rules are cited, and to what degree do these challenges
reflect the well-known asymmetry of economic and political power and capacity between
high- and low-income countries? Is there evidence that trade challenges impact policy?
Here, we address these limitations by taking advantage of a new dataset we created compris-
ing trade challenges to food, beverage, and tobacco regulations among 122 countries at the
WTO TBT during the period from 1995 to 2016. This includes those that occurred both with
and without a subsequent dispute. We thematically analyse the scope, frequency, and content
of trade challenges; identify asymmetries in the economic resources and power of the countries
raising and defending them; and summarise 4 case studies—selected from 4 countries that
faced pressure from developed countries—that illustrate how trade challenges may be invoked
in the context of the TBT framework to influence regulations targeting 3 products that are cen-
tral to NCD prevention: processed foods, soft drinks, and alcohol.
Methods
Constructing a database of trade challenges at the WTO TBT committee
Drawing on published notifications at the WTO TBT and minutes of meetings, we constructed
a dataset (DOI: 10.7910/DVN/EE5UPS) of trade challenges at the TBT Committee by combin-
ing data from 2 sources: the WTO TBT Information Management System (TBT-IMS) database
and written minutes of TBT Committee meetings [30,31]. The TBT-IMS is a freely available
online database of all regulations that the WTO was notified about since its foundation in
1995. The database includes information about the regulation’s original objective(s). These are
coded by the country officials who registered the details of the regulation with the WTO into
one of the WTO’s predefined legitimate policy goals, including ‘the protection of human
health or safety’. The TBT-IMS database summarises information about the challenges, pro-
viding a unique ID for each regulation, its objective, the names of the countries that challenged
that regulation, the trade rules they argued were being contravened, and dates of the TBT
Committee meetings in which these challenges were raised.
To code the dataset, we extracted data about challenges raised about regulations specifically
registered with the objective of ‘protecting human health or safety’. Because the TBT-IMS did
not provide full details of the specific issues cited in each challenge—the type of regulation
being introduced, whether it had been implemented or not, and the products it applied to—we
manually extracted and coded this information from the minutes of TBT meetings in which
each challenge was raised. We obtained these minutes from the WTO’s freely accessible ‘Docu-
ments Online’ repository [32]. To identify discussions about each regulation and associated
challenges, we first identified and downloaded the minutes from each meeting in which the
challenges were raised, as listed in the TBT-IMS database. We then identified challenges about
Trade challenges at the World Trade Organization to noncommunicable disease prevention policies
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each specific regulation using the subheadings in the minutes, which were separated according
to the name and TBT-IMS ID of each regulation under discussion. From the summaries of
each challenge in the relevant subsection of the minutes, we then coded the issues, type of reg-
ulation being introduced, whether it had been implemented, and the products it applied to.
To give a specific example, in May 2011, the US challenged Thailand’s new requirements
for including health-warning labels on alcoholic beverage packages. The minutes from the
TBT Committee meeting at which the challenge was raised stated, under the relevant subhead-
ing of the minutes, that
‘The representative of the United States raised previously-aired concerns, including the sci-
entific basis for the text of the alcohol warning requirements, the size of the warning label
in proportion to the bottle. . .’ (G/TBT/M/53).
Here, we coded the product as ‘beverages’ with the subcategory ‘alcohol’ and we coded the
policy as ‘labelling regulations’. We identified the list of codes following widely applied proce-
dures recommended in Miles, Huberman, and Saldana whereupon a researcher identifies a ‘start
list’ of provisional codes from an initial sample of the data, takes another sample of the data, and
modifies the categories after coding the second sample if necessary [33]. Further details of this
coding procedure, with additional examples, are provided in S1 Text. After coding the products
and other additional information, we then restricted the analytical sample to challenges that were
raised about food, beverage, and tobacco products only. Finally, to study possible economic
asymmetries in trade challenges, we imported country income-level data from the World Bank
World Development Indicators, 2017 edition, and grouped countries into income quartiles
according to their income for the year in which the challenge was raised [34]. The final analytic
sample includes 93 challenges raised in the period from 1995—when the first challenge to a food,
beverage, or tobacco regulation was raised—to 2016, when complete data were last available.
Analysis
To summarise the frequency and content of trade challenges, we calculated the total number
of challenges raised each year by each country per year they had been a WTO member and by
countries according to income quartile. It was not possible to identify the outcome of every
challenge because this was not systematically reported in the TBT-IMS or TBT Committee
meeting minutes, although we could observe whether or not it escalated to a trade dispute and
the number of meetings in which challenges were made towards a policy. We also were able to
code the stage of a policy’s development from information contained in the meeting minutes
into 3 categories: proposed but not ratified or implemented, ratified but not implemented, and
in force. To study potential power asymmetries between wealthier and poorer nations, we
used social network analysis to summarise the frequency of trade challenges between countries
and patterns in the income quartiles of countries forming these dyads.
Finally, to assess the potential impact of challenges on policy, we evaluated, in-depth, 4 case
studies in which trade challenges were associated with changes or delays to food, beverage, or
tobacco regulations. These were selected based on 4 criteria. First, to assess pressure, we
focused on trade challenges involving possible power asymmetries (i.e., from high-income
towards lower-income countries). Second, following previous studies of international political
economy, we selected those cases with heightened importance in scholarly debates [35,36]. In
this literature, it involves challenges around processed foods, sugar-sweetened soft drinks,
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco. Third, we assessed whether data were available to track pol-
icy changes before and after TBT meetings in the TBT minutes. Finally, we excluded the Thai
Trade challenges at the World Trade Organization to noncommunicable disease prevention policies
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traffic light–labelling case and plain tobacco packaging debates because they have already been
described in extensive detail elsewhere [24,28,37]. This yielded 4 cases in Indonesia (processed
foods), Chile (processed foods), Colombia (alcohol), and Saudi Arabia (soft drinks).
Results
Trends in trade challenges to food, beverage, and tobacco regulations,
1995–2016
First, we describe the results from our analysis of trends in trade challenges and the character-
istics of countries raising and defending them. Our analysis of trade challenges at the WTO
between 1995 and 2016 demonstrates that a growing number of food, beverage, and tobacco
regulations are extensively scrutinised and challenged on the basis of their purported violations
of trade rules. Between 1995 and 2016, a total of 93 trade challenges were raised concerning
regulations aimed at protecting individuals from the risks associated with food, beverage, and
tobacco products (see S1 Table). These challenges constituted 17.9% of all challenges raised at
the TBT committee during this period and 38.0% of those pertaining to public health.
As shown in Fig 1, the number of challenges to food, beverage, and tobacco regulations per
year has grown markedly over time, rising from 0 in 1995 to a high of 13 in 2014. Few of these
escalated further, suggesting that they were resolved without resorting to formal WTO chan-
nels. Escalating a challenge to a trade dispute occurred in only 1 instance (1.1% of trade chal-
lenges)—the Australian plain packaging case. Six other disputes have occurred independently
of TBT challenges, citing other agreements. They ruled against, for example, discriminatory
levels of taxation on foreign tobacco products (in the case of Thailand versus US under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], the WTO’s precursor) and alcohol (in the
case of Chile versus European Communities, under the WTO).
A majority of challenges were raised before the policy had been finalised or implemented,
potentially delaying or impeding the policy altogether: 57 (61.3%) food, beverage, and tobacco
regulations had been proposed or drafted but not yet ratified or implemented when the trade
challenges were raised; 12 (12.9%) had been ratified but not implemented; and 24 (25.8%)
were already in force. In addition, a majority of challenges were raised more than once: they
were raised during 1 meeting in 29 (31.2%) cases, during 2 meetings in 20 (21.5%) cases, and
during at least 3 meetings in 44 (47.3%) cases.
Member characteristics and power asymmetries
The European Union (EU), the US, Mexico, and Canada most frequently raised trade chal-
lenges about food, beverage, and tobacco regulations. The highest-income members raised just
under half of all challenges (42 [45.2%] challenges), followed by upper-middle–income mem-
bers (26 [27.9%] challenges), lower-middle–income members (15 [16.1%] challenges), and
low-income members (10 [10.8%] challenges). Trade challenges were most frequently raised
against the EU (n = 11), Brazil (n = 9), Ecuador (n = 6), and Canada (n = 3). Overall, just
under half were raised against the highest-income members (41 [44.1%] challenges), followed
by lower-middle–income members (15 [16.1%] challenges), upper-middle–income members
(14 [15.1%] challenges), and low-income members (22 [23.7%] challenges). The 5 most com-
mon challenge dyads were the EU against Brazil (n = 8), Canada against Ecuador (n = 5), the
EU against Ecuador (n = 5), the US against Brazil (n = 5), and the US against Ecuador (n = 5).
While, overall, high-income members most frequently raised and defended challenges, this
obscures substantial differences in countries’ incomes within each challenge dyad. There were
marked economic power asymmetries: although high-income members, especially the EU and
Trade challenges at the World Trade Organization to noncommunicable disease prevention policies
PLOS Medicine | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590 June 26, 2018 7 / 18
the US, most frequently raised and defended trade challenges, over three-quarters of challenges
raised against low- and lower-middle–income countries were raised by high-income countries.
Thus, high-income members received challenges from other high-income members (19
[20.4%] challenges), from upper-middle–income members (28 [30.1%] challenges), from
lower-middle–income members (19 [20.4%] challenges), and from low-income members (27
[29.0%] challenges) in roughly similar proportions. However, as shown in Fig 2, a large major-
ity of challenges (n = 72, or 77.4%) made to low- and lower-middle–income members were
raised by high-income members, especially the EU, the US, and Canada, followed by upper-
middle–income members (9 [10.0%] challenges) and then by other lower-middle–income
members (6 [6.5%] challenges) as well as low-income members (6 [6.5%] challenges).
Thematic analysis
Next, we describe the policies subject to trade challenges, the products involved, and the trade
rules that other countries argued were violated. As shown in Table 1, the regulations targeted
by trade challenges were diverse. These included infant milk formulae, alcoholic beverages,
soft drinks, manufactured food products and their ingredients, cigarettes, tobacco, and ciga-
rette flavourings.
Fig 1. Trends in trade challenges to food, beverage, and tobacco regulations, 1995–2015. TBT, Technical Barriers to Trade.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590.g001
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As shown in Fig 3, the regulations most frequently challenged were labelling requirements
(39 [41.9%] challenges), product quality standards and restrictions on the use of certain ingre-
dients (18 [19.4%] challenges), ‘conformity assessment procedures’ used for determining
whether an import conformed with a given country’s regulations (12 [12.9%] challenges), and
marketing regulations (10 [10.8%] challenges).
There were diverse arguments raised to challenge the health policies. The most frequent
argument was that the regulations posed an ‘unnecessary barrier to trade’ (15 [16.1%] chal-
lenges), meaning that they thought the goal of the regulation could be achieved through an
alternative policy or regulation that would pose fewer restrictions on trade. For example, in
2013, Mexico challenged Peruvian legislation that mandated health warnings on a range of
food and beverage products high in salt, sugar, and fat and prohibited their sale in schools.
Fig 2. Trade challenges raised against low- and lower-middle–income countries. Notes: node colour represents
country income levels, grouped into quartiles from lowest to highest. Red = Q1, orange = Q2, blue = Q3, and
green = Q4. Lines show challenges raised by and to each node. Node size corresponds with the number of challenges
raised (min = 1; max = 12). The proximity of nodes to one another corresponds to the frequency of challenges raised
against another node (min = 1; max = 5).
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590.g002
Table 1. Food, tobacco, and beverage products that were regulated by measures later subject to trade challenges.
Product Description No.
challenges
Food Food products, including processed foods and their ingredients 46
Beverages Alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, fruit juices and other nonalcoholic beverages, infant
milk formulae
36
Tobacco Tobacco, tobacco flavourings, cigarettes 15
Notes: number of trade challenges about each product category exceeds the number of trade challenges (n = 93)
because some challenges were raised about regulations that affected more than one product.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590.t001
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Mexico argued that the legislation created ‘unnecessary’ trade costs and suggested that ‘daily
meal guides’ could be developed instead (G/TBT/W/60). In 2014, the EU and the US chal-
lenged Thailand’s proposal to introduce graphic health-warning labels on alcoholic beverage
packages by asking Thailand to ‘take into consideration less trade restrictive measures or, fail-
ing this, clarify on which basis and evidence Thailand concluded that different, less costly and
burdensome alternatives than the indication of a graphic health warning would be insufficient
to address the objective pursued’ (G/TBT/N/THA/437, G/TBT/W/64). WTO members also
frequently sought clarification about an aspect of the regulation, such as the scope of products
affected or the timeline to implementation (14 [15.1%] challenges).
The third most common category actually did not cite a specific violation of WTO rules (12
[12.9%] challenges), unlike the other challenges. Alternatively, it focused on how the health
policy posed a barrier or cost to trade—although the argument did not state that this was
‘unnecessary’ (5 [5.4%] challenges). Another common argument was when WTO members
claimed that there were other harmful and unintended consequences, such as causing con-
sumer confusion or increasing unemployment (4 [4.3%] challenges), or questioned whether
the costs of the regulation were proportionate with the risks associated with the products (4
[4.3%] challenges). In other cases, WTO members argued that the scientific evidence support-
ing the measures were inadequate (4 [4.3%] challenges). This complaint was raised against a
range of regulations, including tobacco packaging requirements, alcoholic beverage labelling
Fig 3. Food, beverage, and tobacco measures subject to trade challenges. Notes: see S2 and S3 Tables for full description of policies.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.1002590.g003
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regulations, marketing and labelling requirements for energy drinks, and regulations for
front-of-pack nutrition labelling for diverse food products.
Fourth, WTO members often sought greater transparency in another country’s reporting
procedures (11 [11.8%] challenges), meaning that the country had provided no or little infor-
mation about a measure or had left inadequate time for other countries to adapt to the new
regulations. In addition, members frequently questioned the regulation’s ‘rationale or legiti-
macy’, or why the measure was being introduced in the first place (11 [11.8%] challenges).
Fifth, WTO members regularly challenged regulations by arguing that they were inconsis-
tent with existing international standards, as required by WTO rules (10 [10.8%] challenges).
For example, on at least one occasion, members challenged regulations that were based on
WHO guidelines because these are not officially classified as international standards. For
example, in 2016, the US challenged Thailand’s proposal to introduce mandatory restrictions
on the content and marketing of a milk formula for infants. A Thai official noted that the mea-
sure was based on WHO’s International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes and a
2016 World Health Assembly resolution on ending the inappropriate promotion of foods for
infants and young children. The US raised its objections about the costs of the measure by
arguing that the WHO guidance ‘was not an international standard in accordance with the cri-
teria established by the TBT Committee’ and that ‘the application of the 1981 WHO’s Interna-
tional Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes was voluntary’ (G/TBT/W/69).
Case studies of influence on policy space for the prevention of NCDs
Here, we summarise case studies of a possible influence of trade challenges on policy. We iden-
tified 4 country case studies from Indonesia, Chile, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia that met our
selection criteria as trade challenges from high-income members that were associated with
changes or delays in food and beverage regulations. First, in 2013, the Indonesian government
ratified legislation that mandated the display of health warnings on processed food packages
from April 2016 onwards (G/TBT/N/IDN/84). The warnings would describe the product’s
salt, sugar, and fat content. Several members, including Canada, Australia, and the EU, chal-
lenged the measure at the WTO TBT Committee, questioning the scientific justification for
the measure and requesting that Indonesia consider an alternative measure that would be less
trade burdensome. Later, Indonesia reported to the TBT Committee that the regulation’s
scheduled implementation had been delayed by 4 years to 2019 (G/TBT/W/67). Indonesia also
said that it would reevaluate the regulation and consider alternative approaches to NCD pre-
vention during the extended transition period. This included considering a public education
campaign to increase awareness about the risks associated with excess sugar, salt, and fat con-
sumption instead of imposing mandatory labels, as a representative of the EU had suggested at
an earlier WTO meeting (G/TBT/W/60).
Second, in 2013, Chile proposed legislation that would mandate the display of a ‘STOP’ sign
on the packages of food and beverage products high in salt, sugar, and/or fat. The US, Austra-
lia, Switzerland, Canada, Argentina, and the EU, among others, objected to the measure on 8
occasions between 2013 and 2016. They challenged the basis for deciding the size and colour
of the sign, which was to be red or black and occupy at least 20% of the main face of the pack-
aging (G/TBT/W/59). Chile later reported to the TBT Committee that it had made substantial
changes to the labelling requirements, reducing the required size of the warning label, and had
considered allowing producers to choose between a wider range of colours—including green
(G/TBT/W/62), a colour promoted for voluntary use by a food industry consortium as indica-
tive of a healthy food choice [38]. Chile also announced that the measure’s scheduled imple-
mentation was to be delayed by 3 years from 2013 to 2016. The final measure retained the
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black-only stop sign but reduced it in size to 4%–7% of the package surface [39]. Companies
have 3 years in which to comply with the Chilean legislation, which is now considered the
most extensive food labelling legislation in the world. The domestic and international food
industry is strongly opposed to it, fearing it will diffuse across the Latin American region, and
there remain concerns that the Chilean legislation may trigger a dispute under TBT or intellec-
tual property rights rules at the WTO or an investor–state dispute under investment treaties.
Third, in 2009, Colombia drafted a regulation that would require the display of health warn-
ings about the risks associated with excess alcohol consumption, especially among pregnant
women, on the front label of alcohol packages. In June 2009, the EU and the US complained
that the warning labels would have a burdensome and costly impact on its exports to Colombia
(G/TBT/W/53). The two countries raised this challenge at 4 additional TBT meetings and, in
2013, Colombia notified the WTO that the measure had been substantially amended. The final
regulation significantly reduced the scope of alcohols it affected and no longer imposed any
health-warning labelling requirements (G/TBT/W/55).
Finally, in 2014, the Saudi Arabian government ratified a regulation that mandated the dis-
play of health warnings on energy drink cans. Several members, including the EU, US, and
Switzerland, questioned whether the health warnings were necessary and scientifically accurate
(G/TBT/W/64). In 2017, the Saudi Arabian government implemented the labelling law, which
required a warning stating that ‘energy drinks [are] harmful to health’ [40], but only after an
official representing Saudi Arabia announced that the scheduled implementation of the mea-
sure had been ‘delayed more than once in response to the concerns of WTO Members’ (G/
TBT/W/66).
Discussion
Our systematic analysis of trade challenges at the WTO between 1995 and 2016 demonstrates
that a growing number of food, beverage, and tobacco regulations are extensively scrutinised
and challenged on the basis of their purported violations of trade rules. This yielded at least 4
important findings. First, the regulations targeted by trade challenges were diverse, including
those dealing with infant milk formulae, alcoholic beverages, soft drinks, manufactured food
products and their ingredients, cigarettes, tobacco, and cigarette flavourings. Second, countries
most frequently challenged one another’s labelling regulations and product quality standards
or restrictions on using certain products such as processed meats or cigarette flavourings.
Members often challenged the additional costs of the measure, requested more information,
and sought greater transparency in other country’s notification procedures. Third, there were
marked power asymmetries: although high-income members—especially the EU and the US—
most frequently raised and defended trade challenges, over three-quarters of challenges raised
against low- and lower-middle–income members were raised by high-income members.
Finally, trade challenges were often raised on multiple occasions before the regulation was rati-
fied or implemented, potentially delaying or impeding the policy altogether. In 4 country case
studies from Indonesia, Chile, Colombia, and Saudi Arabia, trade challenges were associated
with changes or delays in food and beverage regulations. In the case of Chile and Saudi Arabia,
these countries did eventually proceed with new laws. It remains possible, however, that both
countries—and especially Chile—may face a formal WTO dispute over their policies.
It has long been debated whether governments invoke trade rules to limit policy space for
preventing NCDs, leading to ‘policy or regulatory chill’ effects, whereupon a government
delays, alters, or abandons its policy in order to avoid the costs associated with a trade dispute
[10]. To our knowledge, our study is the first to systematically analyse this potential pathway
to influencing public health policy. Our study has demonstrated that countries regularly face
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policy pressures at the WTO TBT Committee; that compliance with complaints is frequently
monitored; and that this pressure may have been influential in delaying, altering, or abandon-
ing food, beverage, and tobacco regulations. These results do not imply that WTO rules pro-
vide insufficient flexibility for regulations to promote various policy interests, including public
health. Instead, our analysis shows that governments regularly invoke trade rules to pressure
other countries to change their food, beverage, and tobacco regulations.
Our study also builds on prior research by revealing significant power asymmetries: a
majority (n = 72, or 77.4%) of challenges raised against low- and lower-middle–income coun-
tries was raised by wealthier nations. The dominant players were the US, China, and the EU,
countries often seen as competing for global, political, and economic leadership [41]. At the
WTO, country representatives also stated occasionally that their challenges represented the
interests of the food and beverage industry. For example, in 2013, a representative from the US
commented on Peru’s attempts at introducing health warnings on select food and beverage
products by stating that ‘the US pre-packaged food industry has expressed concern over the
economic impact of the inclusion of warning statements on a mandatory basis’ (G/TBT/W/
60). Similarly, in 2006, a Canadian representative commented on Thailand’s proposed snack
food labelling regulations by noting that ‘the Canadian industry had questioned the scientific
merit of the proposed regulation and argued that it discriminated against snack foods’ in a let-
ter to the Canadian government (G/TBT/W/43). Thus, like other international fora [42–44],
the TBT Committee may serve as a forum in which power asymmetries are exerted and trans-
late into policy leverage. However, it is important to note that WTO rules may also provide
lower-income countries with an opportunity to raise challenges against wealthier countries
that might have otherwise been unavailable [45]. This could explain why one-third of chal-
lenges against high-income countries were raised by low-income countries.
Our approach also demonstrates the importance of evaluating potential regulatory or policy
chill that occurs outside trade disputes and may occur at earlier stages of policy making in
intergovernmental trade committees. Only 1 (1.1%) of the 93 challenges to food, beverage, and
tobacco regulations at the WTO later escalated to a formally adjudicated trade dispute—the
Australian plain packaging case. Insofar as challenges impact policy, this suggests that the
influence of trade rules on NCD prevention via regulatory or policy chill effects is much more
extensive than that indicated by the outcomes of trade dispute rulings.
Our study has several limitations, arising from the nature of the data, which we have sought
to address. It was not possible to identify whether and how all 93 trade challenges ultimately
impacted policy because this information is not systematically reported in the TBT-IMS or the
TBT Committee minutes. Our analysis nevertheless suggests that at least some trade challenges
may have been influential. Most regulations had not yet been ratified or implemented when
challenges were raised, so a change in policy was actually possible. A majority of trade chal-
lenges were also raised repeatedly. This suggests that those raising trade challenges subse-
quently monitored adherence to their complaints and expected that their concerns would be
addressed. In addition, repeated challenges may have increased the incentives for complying
with complaints if they were interpreted as a signal that a politically and economically costly
trade dispute was increasingly likely. Furthermore, we identified 4 cases in which trade chal-
lenges were associated with a reported delay or change in policy. Whilst we cannot definitively
confirm that informal WTO challenges led to these policy changes, the sequencing of these
events—and the incorporation of comments made at the WTO into the final policy—are indi-
cations of influence.
Fourth, we did not evaluate or grade the evidence base associated with public health poli-
cies. However, many of them were WHO-recommended policies. We also did not investigate
the validity of trade challenges citing trade rules. Trade challenges may constitute a legitimate
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complaint about a policy according to TBT rules because, for example, the regulations were
unclear or created additional costs without improving effectiveness. In addition, the applicabil-
ity of trade rules and associated validity of trade challenges may be uncertain due to, for exam-
ple, how scientific ambiguity regarding the effectiveness of regulations and their optimal
design is understood in relation to the TBT Agreement or due to the absence of clear interna-
tional standards, norms, and guidelines. The challenges may also be invalid because they cite
TBT rules where they did not apply. This could include, for example, making false scientific
claims that a proposed policy is ineffective (e.g., plain tobacco packaging) and/or claiming that
an alternative is more effective (e.g., daily meal guides and educational campaigns are a more
effective means to reduce obesity than the proposed regulation). Alternatively, the challenges
may be valid, and the rules genuinely restrictive, when governments seek to introduce regula-
tions without a strong scientific basis and minimal trade cost.
Fifth, it is still possible that regulatory chill occurs without a visible challenge at the TBT
committee due to, for example, the threat of a dispute made outside the WTO, which is not
revealed in WTO documents [19]. Finally, our study may have limited external validity beyond
the TBT Committee and WTO dispute process. This includes disputes within the EU, in which
the European Court of Justice has consistently applied the requirement in the European Trea-
ties to ensure a high level of health in all policies [46]. In addition, our study may not represent
the diverse scope and content of challenges raised under alternative trade and/or investment
agreements, such as bilateral and regional treaties and other agreements that grant legal pro-
tections to investments as well as liberalise trade in goods and services and that extend those
rights to foreign investors (including multinational corporations) as well as to governments
[19]. Nonetheless, our results may be informative elsewhere because government officials fre-
quently stated that trade challenges at the WTO represented concerns raised by food, beverage,
and tobacco corporations, many of whom make substantial foreign investments [8]. In addi-
tion, WTO debates may provide an insight into the challenges that may be raised elsewhere
because the clauses in many subsequent agreements built upon and expanded WTO rules
[14,47,48].
Future research should address these limitations by evaluating whether challenges are
invoked citing other trade agreements and outside trade committees, the validity of trade chal-
lenges and their empirical bases, whether challenges undermine effective public health policies,
and whether challenges raised by low- and lower-middle–income countries were as effective as
those raised by upper-middle–income and high-income countries. In addition, more research
is necessary to investigate the determinants of challenge dyads. For example, a country may
raise a WTO dispute due to high levels and projected growth rates of bilateral trade and invest-
ment, increasing a country’s interest in the introduction of a new policy and its potential
effects. Alternatively, challenges may not correlate with trade flows and instead represent an
effort to ensure that trade costs on all products are kept to a minimum and so prevent the
introduction of costs on the specific products that a country trades in. More research is also
needed to investigate why specific countries are frequently subject to trade challenges. Ecua-
dor, for example, was featured 6 times in TBT Committee challenges despite its small size,
potentially owing to persistent violations of TBT rules or its high levels of activity in imple-
menting food, beverage, and tobacco regulations to prevent NCDs [54].
Our study has important implications for NCD prevention. There is now substantial evi-
dence both that mandatory measures addressing price, availability, and marketing of food,
beverage, and tobacco products are the most effective low-cost tools for preventing and
controlling NCDs and that these measures are most aggressively opposed by the global corpo-
rations that manufacture them [49]. Thus, governments—informed by the increasing interna-
tional exchange of ideas—are seeking to introduce them at a time when new trade deals are
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being negotiated at an unprecedented rate. Whereas tariffs—a type of trade tax—were previ-
ously the mainstay of trade negotiations, product rules and regulations are now regarded as
constituting the greatest barriers to international trade in many industries [50]. For EU–US
trade as a whole, for example, regulatory differences are estimated to have a trade-dampening
effect equivalent to a 30% import tax [51]. Harmonising regulatory differences, including
those in the food, beverage, and tobacco sectors, is therefore a central goal of contemporary
trade policy [48]. Our study shows that countries have regularly argued that one another’s
food, beverage, and tobacco regulations—including those targeting NCDs—violate trade rules
despite the presence of health exceptions in WTO rules, suggesting that these may be renegoti-
ated under new, as well as existing, trade agreements.
Finally, our results have implications for trade policy and negotiations. The fact that WTO
rules are regularly used to challenge new food, beverage, and tobacco regulations suggests that
partners in other trade agreements may invoke their rules to challenge one another’s policies
targeting NCD reduction. A related body of research on the effects of trade rules and agree-
ments found that they can contribute to substantial rises in the availability, affordability, and
promotion of tobacco, food, and beverages that increase the risk of NCDs [18,29]. This sug-
gests that new trade agreements could undermine NCD prevention by encouraging higher
consumption of harmful food, beverages, and tobacco products whilst also being invoked to
hinder a government’s ability to introduce new legislation aimed at reducing consumption.
Trade negotiations may be a critical window for ensuring that trade rules help rather than hin-
der policy makers’ commitments to prevent and control NCDs.
Conclusions
Our systematic analysis of trade challenges at the WTO between 1995 and 2016 demonstrates
that a growing number of food, beverage, and tobacco regulations are extensively scrutinised
and challenged on the basis of their purported violations of trade rules. This pressure may
have been influential in delaying, altering, or abandoning food, beverage, and tobacco regula-
tions. Our study also revealed significant power asymmetries: a majority (77.4%) of challenges
raised against low- and lower-middle–income countries was raised by high-income countries.
These findings show that policy makers appear to face significant pressure to design food, bev-
erage, and tobacco regulations that other countries will deem consistent with WTO rules and
that policy making in low- and lower-middle–income countries may face pressure from the
economic and political interests of wealthier nations.
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